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A SURVEY OF THE IMPACT OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY
ACT ON EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICESt
KEITH W. BLINN*
W ITH the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947,1 many problems were posed concerning its effect
on the extensive body of decisional law established through
twelve years of administration of the predecessor Wagner
Act.2 While it is virtually assumed that the Taft-Hartley Act
will be amended, in almost all quarters there is a measure of
agreement that some of the changes effected in the Wagner
Act by the amendments were justified as the result of the
experience gained in administering the Wagner Act. Even
the most severe criticism from "labor" is primarily directed
toward the newly established union unfair labor practices.
The scope of this article is not to analyze in detail but rather
to survey the impact of the Taft-Hartley Act upon the em-
ployer unfair labor practices.
While the basic philosophy of the law remains unchanged,
certain of the fundamental premises have been qualified and
altered including the finding that industrial strife is not solely
attributable to the denial by employers of the right of em-
ployees to organize and the refusal of employers to accept
the procedures of collective bargaining but that "experience
has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor
organizations, their officers, and members have the intent
or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce
through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest . .. ."s
The Taft-Hartley Act also expressly recognizes that employees
have the ".... right to refrain from any and all ... [concerted
activities]."'
t This article was published in Marq. L. Rev., Dec. (1948).
*Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. Formerly Attorney, National
Labor Relations Board.
I Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong. 1st Seas.,
61 Stat ....... 29 U.S.C. 1141 st seq. (1947 Supp.).
sNational Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 st seq.
(1940).
3 11 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. All citations to sections
refer to the amended Act unless otherwise specified.
417.
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A. COVERAGE OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT.
Despite suggestions from certain quarters that the Board's
jurisdiction be restricted so that a greater area might be left
for State action, the Taft-Hartley Act like the predecessor
Wagner Act is based upon unfair labor practices and questions
of representation "affecting commerce."', This latter term is
broadly defined as "in commerce, or burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led to or
tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce."6 These provisions
were held as broad as the constitutional power of Congress.i
Section 10 (a) was amended to provide "that the Board is
empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or
Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases
in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, com-
munications, and transportation except where predominantly
local in character) even though such cases may involve labor
disputes affecting commerce, unless the provisions of the State
or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such
cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding
provision of this Act or has received a construction incon-
sistent therewith." This has served to clarify some ".... over-
tones of meaning that regardless of the consent of the National
Board, ... [a State board] .. . is excluded from enforcing
rights of collective bargaining in all industries within its
borders as to which Congress has granted opportunity to
invoke the authority of the National Board,"8 which resulted
from the Supreme Court opinion in the Bethlehem case. Ac-
cordingly, it is now possible for the National Board to make
working agreements with State boards so that the latter may
dispose of a large number of employer-employee disputes
where hearing otherwise might be indefinitely postponed by
the N. L. R. B. due to budgetary limitations or the pressure
of a large backlog of cases' providing the State legislation is
consistent with the federal legislation and is interpreted con-
3i 10(a).
6 12(6) and (7).
7 N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
8 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767
(1947) concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter at page 778.
9 It is clear that the Board intends to continue to exercise its administrative
discretion by refusing for administrative reasons to take jurisdiction in certain
cases. In Matter of Duke Power Co., 77 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1948).
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sistent with it.1o A limitation in the coverage of the Taft-
Hartley Act has been effected by defining the term "employee"
as expressly excluding supervisory employees," thus bringing
to a close a rather long and bitter struggle within the Board
itself. The Board's administrative policy on supervisory em-
ployees had been vacillating ;12 however, starting with the
Packard case' s the Board had started to re-establish the status
of supervisory employees as "employees within the meaning
of the Act" thus permitting them to constitute a unit appropri-
ate for the purposes of collective bargaining. The effect of the
new definition of "employee" is to reverse the court approved
administrative construction of the Wagner Act" and finally
settle the controversy so that supervisory employees cannot
be included within a bargaining unit or constitute a separate
unit by themselves. The Board in considering a representation
case'5 under the amended Act determined that the statutory
definition of "supervisory employee" merely continued the
Board's previous policy in determining at what point an em-
ployee becomes managerial or supervisory. The Board pointed
out that the problem is "to some extent necessarily a matter
of degree of authority exercised .. . [and includes those] who
formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing
and making operative the decisions of their employer .... "
Thus, there was a heavy reliance upon the statutory require-
ment that for the position to be supervisory, it must require
"the use of independent judgment." A further limitation in
the coverage of the Act was effected through the specific ex-
clusion of any individual having the status of an independent
contractor from the term "employee." 8 In the Hearst case1t
the Supreme Court considered the status of newsboys as em-
ployees and speaking through Justice Rutledge it was held
10 For a detailed analysis see, Smith The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdic-
tion over Labor Relations 46 MICH. L. REv. 593 (1948).
11 Supervisor is defined as ". . . any individual having authority, in the in-
terest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, dis-
charge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in
connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires independent judnient." § 2(11).
12 11 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 30-35 (1945); Note (1947) 32 IOWA L. REv. 595.
Is In Matter of Packard Motor Car Company, 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
14 Packard Motor Car Company v. N.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
Is In Matter of Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corporation, 75 N.L.R.B. 320
(1947).
e 12(3).
17 N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944).
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that the economic facts such as the inequality of bargaining
power and the dependency of the newsboys on the company
for daily earnings was such that it made the relationship more
nearly one of employment than of an individual business enter-
prise and in view of the social purpose underlying the legis-
lation such a classification might outweigh a technical legal
classification. The Senate report indicates a clear legislative
policy to override Board policy by stating .... "The legal effect
of the amendment therefore is merely to make it clear that
the question whether or not a person is an employee is a
question of law, since the term is not meant to embrace persons
outside that category under the general principle of the
law of agency."18
B. EMPLOYER'S RESPONSIBILITY
Under the Wagner Act the employer was responsible for
any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly
or indirectly ...."19 whiie the Supreme Court consistently
reiterated that the question is not one of legal liability in
damages or for penalties on principles of agency or respondeat
superior, but only whether the Act condemned such activities
as unfair labor practices so far as the employer gained ad-
vantages in the bargaining process ;20 nevertheless, the actual
decided cases did not fall far beyond the pale of the technical
rules of agency. Within the recognized principles of agency,
the agent, acting within the sphere of his apparent authority,
may subject his principal to liability by acts done in violation
of secret instructions or limitations which were unknown
to the third person. 21 However, the employer definition was
amended to include ". . . any person acting as an agent of
any employer directly or indirectly..." 22 Bearing directly
on the problem is the newly added definition of the term
"agent" which provides "In determining whether any person
is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make such
other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether
the specific acts performed were actually authorized or sub-
is93 Cong. Rec. 6441 (1947).
19 § 2(2) of the Wagner Act.
"u International Association of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72 (1940).
rehearing denied 311 U.S 72% (1941); H. J. Heinz Company v. N.L.R.B., 311
U.S. 614 (1941).
21 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 160 (1933) ; Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Man-
agcment Relatiows Act, 1947, 61 HAHV. L. Rtv. 1 pp. 8-12 (1947).
1-2 § 2(2).
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sequently ratified shall not be controlling." 23 Regardless of the
extent of change actually achieved by the change in language,
it seems unquestionably the intent of Congress to abrogate
any effects of the I. A. M. case"' beyond the sphere of estab-
lished agency principles as Senator Taft stated "[it] restores
the law of agency as it has been developed by common law." "*
C. THE "FREE SPEECH" CLAUSE.
Until the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, "free speech"
in unfair labor practice cases was evaluated and protected on
the basis of a constitutional guarantee and the Supreme Court
in stating "The mere fact that language merges into a course
of conduct does not put that whole course without the range of
otherwise applicable administrative power. In determining
whether the Company actually interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees, the Board has the right to look
at what the company has said, as well as what it has
done .... -2 Thus, the propriety of the "totality doctrine"
was firmly established. However, section 8 (c) expressly pro-
vides that "The expression of any views, arguments, or opin-
ion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed,
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence
of any unfair labor practice . . . if such expression contains
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." The direct
impact of this amendment is upon the totality doctrine since
the speech cannot be evidence of an unfair labor practice un-
less, standing alone, it is violative of the Act by containing
a threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. It is worthy
of note that while the former General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board, Gerhard P. Van Arkel, concurs in this
interpretation of section 8 (c)2 8 there are others who feel that
the Board should continue to apply the totality doctrine."s Dur-
ing debate on this section Senator Taft illustrated his view
by agreeing with Senator Pepper that if on Monday an em-
2832(13).
41nternational Association of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 811 U.S. 72 (1940)
rehearing denied 811 U.S. 729 (1941).
25 93 Cong. Rec. 6859 (1947).
20 Sinsheimer, Employer Free Speech-A Comparative Analysis, 14 U. OF CuI.
L. Rav. 617 (1947).
27 N.L.R.B. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 814 U.S. 469, 478 (1941).
25 Van Arkel, An Analysis of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 pp.
28-26, Practicing Law Institute (1947); C.C.H. Lab. L. Course 1 1546 (1947).
2s Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HAv.
L. Rsv. 1 pp. 15-20 (1947).
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ployer said to his employees: "I hate labor unions and I think
they are a menace to the country !" nevertheless this% remark
would not be competent evidence to determine whether a union
steward discharged by the same employer shortly theieafter
was fired for union activity.s° If Senator Taft's illustration
is to be applied literally, it would restrict the use of evidence
in labor board cases more than ordinarily applied in our courts.
The Board in at least one case has indicated an adjustment to
this interpretation of section 8 (c).11 In the Bailey case the
Trial Examiner prior to the amendment found that the respon-
dent had violated section 8 (a) (1) by engaging in an unlawful
course of conduct including the distribution of certain "anti
Union circulars and notices." The Board considered the case
after the amendments and in concurring that respondent had
violated the said section stated "Our finding in this respect,
however, is based solely upon the promises of economic benefits
made by the respondent to its employees immediately- proceed-
ing the election. We do not, as did the Trial Examiner, predi-
cate our unfair labor practice finding upon the statements con-
tained in the circulars and notices distributed by the res-
pondent, for although they clearly indicate the respondent's
antipathy toward the Union and its leaders and the respond-
ent's preference for individual bargaining, they appear to be
only such expressions of opinion as are protected by the con-
stitutional guarantee of free speech. ... We do not base our
8 (1) finding on a course of conduct theory. '3 2
30 93 Cong. nee. 6604; Mulroy, The Taft-Hartley Act in Action, 15 U. OF CH i.
L. Rev. 595, 611 (1948) in which the writer quoting N.A.M. General Counsel
Smethurst states, "obviously, this construction would impose a harsher rule of
evidencP even than existed under common law rules in criminal cases."
a' In Matter of The Bailey Company, 75 N.L.R.B. 941 (1948); also see In
Matter of Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, 75 N.L.R.B. 883 (1948).
32 In H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong. 1st Sess., the house conference managers
reported "Both the House bill and the Senate amendment contained provisions
designed to protect the rights of both employers and labor organizations to free
speech. The conference agreement adopts the provisions of the House bill in this
respect with one change derived from the Senate amendment .... The practice
which the Board has had in the past of: using speeches and publications of
employers concerning labor organizations and collective bargaining arrangelnents
as evidence, no matter how irrelevant or immaterial, that some later act iof-the
employer had an illegal purpose gave rise to the necessity of this change-in the
law. The purpose is to protect the right of free speech when what the employer
says or writes is not of a threatening nature or does not promise i" prohibited
favorable discrimination." U.S. Cong. Serv.-80th Cong., 1st Ses., p. 1.151 (1947).
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D. LIMITATIONS UPON PARTY FILING UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
CHARGE
The amended Act provides that the Board's facilities shall
not be available to a labor organization until it has filed certain
information concerning the organization 33 and its officers have
executed "non-communist affidavits. "3' The Congressional ob-
jective of the latter requirement was to remove Communist
Party members and persons affiliated with the Party from
official positions in the unions.3 5 As the result of General
Counsel Denham's interpretation that section 9 (h) required
the officers of the parent body such as the A. F. of L. and the
C. 1. 0. to execute non communist affidavits before any of their
local unions could use the facilities of the N. L. R. B., there was
a virtual boycott of the N. L. R. B. until the Board itself re-
versed this ruling on the ground that section 9 (h) was am-
biguous and that the purpose of the law would be better
realized through a policy not requiring the officers of the
parent body to execute these affidavits.38 In view of the fact
that "any person" s3t may file a charge alleging that an employer
has engaged in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce
and section 9 (h) is applicable only to labor organizations,
it is obvious that through the use of charges filed by indi-
as 39(f) and (g).
54 1 9(h) provides "... and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge
made by a labor organization . . .unless there is on file with the Board an affida-
vit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve month period by
each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or inter-
national labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he
is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that
he does not believe in, and is not the member of or supports any organization
that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by
force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods."
35H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., states "At least 11 great national
unions and a large number of. local unions seem to have fallen into the hands; of
Communists, although in every case Communists appear to compose only a very
small minority of the membership. In most of these cases the rank and file object
to:communistic influence in their unions. By the bill of rights set forth in section
8 (c), the bill helps them to rid themselves of communistic control. Section
9(f) (6) makes it incumbent upon the union leaders who now tolerate Communist
infiltration in their organizations, affiliates, and locals, and temporize with it,
to clean house or risk loss of the rights under the new act." For a discussion of
the problems concerning the constitutionality of this provision see, Note (1948)
48 CoL. L. Rzv. 253. Compare: National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog,
78 rF. Supp. 146 (D.C. D.C. 1948).
.In Matter of Northern Virginia Broadcasters, Inc., Radio Station WARL,
75 N.LR.B. 11 (1947). For a criticism of this case see, Note (1947).27 NEBR. L.
Ray. 120.
37 Ruleit and Regulations Series 5- 203.9 provides "A charge that any person
has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair. labor practice affecting commerce
may be made by any person." C.C.H. Fed. Adm. Proc. p. 37,503.
NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
viduals, a labor organization may evade section 9 (h) ; how-
ever, in the case of a refusal to bargain charge under section
8 (a) (5) it appears that the union must have complied with
the filing provisions before the board will issue a remedial
order under this section."5 This view has been reinforced by
a statement of policy made by N. L. R. B. Associate General
Counsel Brooks in advising that while the Board will continue
to process discrimination charges filed by individuals, it will
not permit non complying labor organizations to evade the
filing requirements through the subterfuge of individual filed
charges in refusal to bargain cases.3 However, upon a charge
filed by an employer, the Board may find that the union, al-
though a non-complying union, has refused to bargain with the
employer in violation of section 8 (b) (3) ; but the Board care-
fully noted, however, that this does not amount to a certi-
fication of the non-complying union and it is ordered to bargain
with the employer upon request.'0
Under the Wagner Act, the Board has consistently main-
tained that no doctrine of laches was applicable to it when
issuing a remedial back pay order despite the fact that it might
reach back over a substantial period and thus there was no
limitation of time within which a charge might be filed or
the complaint might be issued." However, the Board con-
sidered circumstances which seemed to justify limiting the
period for which back pay would be ordered such as inex-
cusable delay in filing charges' 2 and delay in issuing the com-
plaint.'3 During the legislative discussion of the Taft-Hartley
Act the House bill recommended that "no complaint should
issue stating a charge of an unfair labor practice that occurred
more than six months before the charge was filed, or based on
a charge that was filed more than six months before the com-
plaint was issued."" In the joint conference it was agreed to
accept the Senate amendment which provided ". . . no com-
58 In Matter of Marshall and Bruce Company, 75 N.L.R.B. 90 (1947).
39 C.C.H. Lab. L. Serv. Rep. Letter No. 386, p. 11 (Feb. 19, 1948).
40 In Matter of National Maritime Union of America, 78 N.L.R.B. No. 18?
decided August 17, 1948.
41 In Matter of Baker Manufacturing Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1948); In Mat-
ter of Gibbs Corporation, 74 N.L.R.B. 1182 (1947).
42 In Matter of Kalamazoo Coaches, Inc. 66 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (1946); In Matter
of Chas. E. Austin, Inc., 49 N.L.R.B. 1048 (1943).
43 In Matter of Louisville Railway Company, 69 N.L.R.B. 691 (1946).
44 H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; U.S. Cong. Serv.-80th Cong. 1st
Sess. p. 1159 (1947).
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plaint should issue based upon any unfair labor practice oc-
curring more than six months before the filing of the charge
and the service of a copy of the charge upon the person against
whom the charge is made.. "' Hence cases may be delayed
after the charge is filed as the result of either administrative
carelessness or justifiable administrative difficulty during
which the respondent may have no relief; but, the respondent
may be assured that "stale" discriminatory discharge cases
where charges are not filed and of which he has no notice will
not continue to plague him after the running of the six month
period of limitation."
E. RULES OF EVIDENCE AND REVIEW OF BOARD ORDERS.
The Board formerly was freed of the technical common law
rules of evidence under the statutory authority that in con-
nection with the hearings before the Trial Examiner in unfair
labor practice cases ". . . the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law or equity shall not be controlling ... ."4 This
flexible rule of admitting evidence coupled with the provision
that the Board's findings of facts "... if supported by evidence,
shall be conclusive [upon the reviewing court]'. . ." which was
interpreted by the Supreme Court as meaning "substantial
evidence,"' 8 in the opinion of the House, gave too great a lati-
tude in choosing the evidence that it would believe and use as
the basis of its findings and too great an effect to the findings
that rest on such evidence."s Thus, when the House report
referred to certain court decisions describing the results as
"shocking injustices," "overwhelmingly opposed by the evi-
dence," and findings that "strain our credulity," it concluded
that the reviewing courts under the Supreme Court interpreta-
4- 1 10(b). Rules and Regulations Series 5 - 1203.14 provides "Upon the
filing of a charge, the charging party shall be responsible for the timely and
proper service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is
made. The Regional Director will as a matter of course, cause a copy of such
charge to be served upon the person against whom the charge is made, but he
shall not be deemed to assume responsibility for such service." C.C.H. Fed. Adm.
Proc. p. 37,504.
46 In Matter of California Metal Trades Ass'n, et al, decided by N.L.R.B.
Nov. 8, 1948.
4T § 10(b) of the Wagner Act.
4' Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
49 H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) which cites as examples
Wilson & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 126 F. (2d) 114, 117 (C.C.A. 7th 1942); N.L.R.B. v
Columbia Products Corp., 141 F. (2d) 687 (C.C.A. 2nd 1944); and N.L.R.B. v.
Union Pacific Stages, Inc., 99 F. (2d) 153 (C.C.A. 9th 1938).
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tion of the statute were powerless to correct the Board's
abuses.
The first criticized portion was corrected by providing that
"... any such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be con-
ducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in
the district courts of the United States . ."5 thus leaving to
the Board and the reviewing court the determination whether
it was impracticable to conform to the district court rules of
evidence and if error was committed whether it resulted in
a substantial error. In rectifying the second basis of criticism,
reference is still made to the Board's findings of fact as being
conclusive is supported by substantial evidence but it is care-
fully qualified by the phrase ".... on the record considered as a
whole . . ."51 The report of the joint conference committee
expressly states that the new language of the judicial review
section will very materially broaden the scope of the courts'
reviewing power and while it is not intended to provide a trial
de novo, it will prevent the alleged abdication of the courts to
the Board. In this connection the amended Act requires that
the Board in making findings of fact must base them "... . upon
the preponderance of the testimony taken . . ."°5 Under the
newly granted power of review it is intended that the courts
have a duty to see that the Board observes this limitation and
that it not infer facts not supported by evidence or that it
concentrate on one element of proof and ignore other proof
without some adequate explanation of its reasons for dis-
regarding it.
F. INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT AND COERCION.
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act remains unchanged in language
and still forbids the employer from "interfering with, re-
straining or coercing employees" in the exercise of their rights
of sel' organization guaranteed in section 7 of the Act. It is
significant that while it was assumed that the right to self
organization also included the right to "refrain from such
activity" the Act now gives express recognition of this right.53
Excluding the derivative violations of this section undoubtedly
the greatest bulk of the cases involving independent inter-
60 1 10(b).
51 1 10(e) and (f).
52 H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. D. S. Cong., Serv. - 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. p. 1161-3 (1947).
53 Footnote 4, supra.
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ference, restraint and coercion arise out of either oral or
written statements. Accordingly, the previously discussed new
interpretations of employer responsibility and free speech will
have the greatest impact upQn this unfair labor practice. Sub-
ject to these qualifications conduct previously proscribed by
this section including espionage 'and surveillance,"4 economic
coercion," anti-union statements," unduly restrictive non-
solicitation rules,s5 questioning employees concerning union
membership,"s and various other activities will continue to
fall within the ban of this unfair labor practice.
G. DOMINATION OF OR INTERFERENCE WITH A LABOR
ORGANIZATION.
While the substance of section 8 (a) (2) remains unchanged
and continues to declare it to be an unfair labor practice for
the employer to interfere with the employee's right of self
organization by means of the so-called company dominated
union and forbids the employer from "dominating or inter-
fering with the formation or administration of any labor or-
ganization,"'8 amendments made by section 10 (c) and 9 (c)
(2) seek to wipe out a long standing disparity of treatment
accorded non-affiliated dominated unions which has been the
subject of much criticism. Thus, in connection with the pro-
posed House bill the House report comments "A second change
forbids the admitted practice of the old Board of discriminat-
ing against independent unions, simply because they are inde-
pendent, by ordering with respect to them more drastic
penalties that it orders for unions affiliated with the A. F. of L.
or the C. I. 0. in similar circumstances... " 60
Congress found that this disparity took the form in the
case of affiliated unions in permitting "employers to provide
bulletin boards in their plants for the union's use, to give
Oi N.L.R.B. v. Collins and Aikman Corp., 146 F. (2d) 454 (C.C.A. 4th 1945);
In Matter of Sohio Pipe Line Company, 75 N.L.R.B. 858 (1948).
5s N.L.R.B. v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 140 F. (2d) 404 (C.C.A. 5th
1944); In Matter of O'Keefe and Merritt Mfg. Company, 75 N.L.R.B. 117 (1947).
56 N.L.R.B. v. Vincennes Steel Corp., 107 F. (2d) 169 (C.C.A. 7th 1941); CF.
In Matter of Atlanta Metallic Company, 75 N.L.R.B. 208 (1947).
57 Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Daykin, Employ-
ees' Right to Organize on Company Time and Property 42 ILL. L. REv. 301 (1947).
58 In Matter of Ames Spot Welder Company Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 352 (1947).
6912 N.L.R.B, Aim. REp. 27-28 (1947); N.L.R.B. v. J. H. Mathews & Co.,
156 F. (2d) 706 (C.C.A. 3rd 1946).s eo H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) which cites hearings by the
Special House Committee to Investigate the N.L.R.B., part 9, pages 1867, 1908-9,
2052-3 Part II page 2242 and others.
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union officials preferred treatment in laying off workers and
calling them back, and to allow shop stewards without losing
pay to confer not only with the employer but with the em-
ployees as well, and to transact .other union business in the
plant ... [while not permitting] the employer to do the same
things for non-affiliated unions . . ."61 There was also a dis-
parity of treatment in connection with the type of remedial
order issued.62 The Taft-Hartley Act now makes it mandatory
on the Board to apply the same rules of decision irrespective
of whether or not the labor organization affected is affiliated
with a labor organization national or international in scope.68
H. DISCRIMINATION IN REGARD TO HIRE OR TENURE OF
EMPLOYMENT.
In the basic wording of section 8 (a) (3) there has been no
change in the unfair labor practices which forbids an em-
ployer from discriminating ". . . in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to en-
courage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion .... ." But again another section of the amended Act has
a serious impact in that it is provided that "no order of the
Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an
employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the pay-
ment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended
or discharged for cause."6 4 While the Board has consistently
maintained that in administering this section of the Wagner
Act it does not seek to interfere with the normal exercise by
an employer of his rights to select or discharge his employees
for any reason other than those forbidden by the Act, it did
normally find discriminatory treatment violative of the Act
if the action was prompted even in part by a desire or effort
to interfere with the free right of self organization although
there ,night exist concurrently a valid reason for such treat-
ment of the employee. 5
The original House bill provided "No order of the Board
shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an em-
81 H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; U.S. Cong., Serv. - 80th Cong. 1st
Seas. p. 1146 and 1160-1161 (1947).
62 Compare the Board's Order in the following cases: In Matter of Bradford
Machine Tool Company, 44 N.L.R.B. 759 (1942) and In Matter of Hancock Brick
and Tile Company, 44 N.L.R.B. 920 (1942).
633 10(c).
6 10(c).
65 11 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 37 (1946).
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ployee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment
to him of any back pay, unless the weight of the evidence shows
that such individual was not suspended or discharged for
cause." e In the House report on this bill there is a reference
to the Wyman Gordon case which it describes as typical of
the Board's attitude since that case involved the problem of
double motivation for discharge and the Board in ordering
reinstatement with back pay admitted that the employee was
guilty of misconduct but inferred that because he was a mem-
ber or an official of a union, that the latter and not the mis-
conduct was the reason for his discharge.68 While the language
suggested by the House was not finally incorporated in the
amended Act, the joint conference committee clearly indicated
that the "suspended or discharged for cause" of section of 10
(c) was intended to rectify the alleged abuse of inferring an
unlawful motive in the employer's action." It has been pre-
viously discussed in subdivision E of this article, supra, that
under the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board's findings of fact can no
longer be based merely upon some credible evidence, but must
be grounded upon a preponderance of the testimony in the
whole case.
A substantial change has been made in the proviso of sec-
tion 8 (a) (3) which formerly permitted various types of
contracts providing union security clauses. The amended
Act authorizes only contracts which (a) require membership
as a condition of employment on or after the thirtieth day of
employment; and (b) after a majority of the employees within
the appropriate unit covered by such contract have authorized
the union to negotiate for such an agreement. 0 Section 9 (e)
(1) provides the procedures for such elections while section
9 (e) (2) makes provision for elections to rescind the union's
authority to negotiate for such an agreement. Since it was
s6 H.R. 3020 as passed by the House of Representatives April 17, 1947.
6? In Matter of Wyman-Gordon Company, 62 N.L.R.B. 561 (1945).
63 H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). For a study of the history
of the Taft-Hartley Act indicating a restriction of the protected area for strik-
ers' collective activity see Blinn, Rights and Obligations of Strikers Under the
Ta/ft.Hartley Act 13 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1948).
69 The conference committee report states that "... The conference agree-
ment omits the 'weight of evidence' language, since the Board, under the general
provisions of section 10 must act on a preponderance of the evidence, ... "
H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; U. S. Cong., Serv.--80th Cong., 1st
8ess. p. 1161 (1947).
TO 8 S(a) (3).
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a recognized fact that many States had enacted laws or
adopted constitutional provisions to make all forms of com-
pulsory unionism in those States illegal, Congress in seeking
to accommodate this Act to the State policy provided in section
14 (b) that nothing in the Taft-Hartley Act was to be con-
strued as authorizing any closed shop, union shop, mainte-
nance of membership, or other form of compulsory unionism
agreement in any State where the execution of such an agree-
ment was contrary to State policy.7'1 The Board has interpreted
this as prohibiting it from conducting a union shop election
in those States thus making the State law controlling 2 since
there can be no valid union security clause without the union
shop election.
Assuming that the above discussed requirements are ob-
served, the next problem posed is the enforcement of the union
security clause by the employer upon request by the union.
For some time the Board had been attempting to reconcile the
apparent conflict between giving full amplification to the un-
derlying philosophy of the right of self organization guaran-
teed in section 7 of the Act and at the same time observing
the private contract rights flowing out of a valid collective
bargaining contract containing some form of union security
clause. Thus, there was evolved a court approved policy of
giving effect, within limits, to the valid union security clauses
where dual unionism was the basis of the employee's non-
membership in the union which resulted in his discharge or
other discrimination against him.7"
While it appears that the previous decisional law continues
to be applicable in that the employer may not acquiesce in tie
union's demand to rid the force of employees of those engaging
in dual unionism, the amended Act seeks to extend protection
to the individual employee from other possible arbitrary action
by the union whereby he may be expelled from membership
71 H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; U.S. Cong., Serv.---80th Cong., Ist
Sess., p. 1166 (1947).
12 In Matter of Giant Food Shopping Center, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. No. 133-(1948).
Ts Wallace Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 323 U.S. 248 (1944); N.L.R.B. v. American White
Cross Laboratories, Inc., 160 F. (2d) 75 (C.C.A. 2nd 1947); N.L.R.B. v. Portland
Lumber Mills, 158 F. (2d) 365 (C.C.A. 9th 1946) writ of cert. dismissed 68 S. Ct.
347 (1948); 12 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 49 (1947). Cf. In Matter of Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1948).
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
and: his discharge be demanded. 7' This protection is afforded
by the:further proviso that "... no employer shall justify any
discrimination against an employee for non-membership in
a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that such membership was not available to the em-
ployee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable
to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that membership was denied or terminated for rea-
sons other than the failure of the employee to tender the
periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a con-
dition or acquiring or retaining membership."15 It has been
suggested that the union by demanding discharge of an em-
ployee before expulsion would evade this section since it refers
only to discrimination for non-membership in a labor organi-
zation.7 6 However, such an evasion would only be applicable
to cases where the employer assented to the demand of the
union which does not seem to be a true evasion since such
action would be equally possible absent any union security
clause in the collective bargaining agreement. A criticism
suggested by Board member, Reynolds, dissenting in the
Lewis Meier case" that the union should be made a co-respon-
dent in the proceeding seems to be partially answered by an
amendment to section 10 (c) that back pay may be required of
the employer or the labor organization dependent upon which
was responsible for the discrimination.
I. REFUSAL To BARGAIN.
Section 8 (a) (5) continues the language of a similar section
in the pre-existing law which required that employers bargain
collectively with the representative of its employees within an
appropriate bargaining unit.78 Section 8 (b) (3) places a cor-
relative duty on the labor organization which is the employee
74 For discussion of numerous alleged abuses through the use of union security
clauses against minorities within the union see Senate Report No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) pp. 6-7.
7s 1 8(a) (3). By causing or attempting to cause the employer to discriminate
against an employee based upon nonmembership where membership in the union
has been denied or terminated other than on these grounds, the labor organiza-
tion's action will be violative of section 8(b) (2).
76 Van Arkel, An Analysis of the Labor Mauageinsnt Relations Act, 1947 p. 31
Practicing Law Institute (1947).
77 In Matter of Lewis Meier & Company, 73 N.L.R.B. 520 (1947).
78 For a detailed analysis see Weyand, The Scope of Collective Bargaining
Under t le Taft-Hartley Act First Annual Report of New York University Con-
ference on Labor (1948).
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representative to bargain collectively with the employer.
Newly added section 8 (d) in defining the duty to bargain
adopt a substantial portion of the decisional law developed
under the Wagner Act.79 However, in stating that "... such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession. .... " was not intended to
relieve the bargaining parties from making counterproposals
since the word "counterproposal" was removed from an early
draft of the bill and the word "concession" substituted based
upon an objection raised by the Chairman of the Board.80 Thus
in re-emphasizing the fundamental federal philosophy of the
importance of free collective bargaining 1 one element is re-
moved and one new element added.to the area formerly recog-
nized as good faith bargaining. Under the previous decisions
the Board has consistently held that the duty to bargain was
a continuing one and that the employer was obligated to nego-
tiate with the accredited bargaining agency concerning the
modification, interpretation, and administration of the exist-
ing contract.8 2 However, section 8 (4) asserts that the duty to
bargain "... shall not be construed as requiring either party to
discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and condi-
tions contained in a contract for a fixed period ... ." Thus, the
employer is still obliged to continue to confer with the bargain-
ing representative concerning the application and interpreta-
tion of the contract during its term but need not confer regard-
ing its modification; the line between modification and inter-
pretation may indeed become obscure.83 Where there is an
existing collective bargaining contract, there is added as a
part of the duty to bargain under section 8 (d) the require-
79 H. J. Heinz Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U. S. 514 (1941); Rapid Roller Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 126 F. (2d) 452 (C.C.A. 7th 1942) cert. denied. 317 U.S. 650 (1942);
Globe C-tton Mills v. N.L.R.B., 103 F. (2d) 91 (C.C.A. 5th 1939).
80 Senate Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
8' N.L.R.B. General Counsel Denham, The Taft-Hartley Act 20 TENN. L. REV.
168, 179 (1948) refers to the collective bargaining process under the- Act as
"... the very heart of the Act. . . " It has been suggested that the legitimate
field of collective bargaining has been restricted by limitations imposed by other
sections of the Act such as restrictions on union security clauses, If 8(a) (3),
8(b) (2) and 9(e), restrictions on check off of union dues and assessments, 1 302
(a) and (c), restrictions on featherbedding provisions in contracts, 1 8(b) (6)
and others. Weyand, The Scope of Collective Bargaining Under the Taft-Hartley
Act First Annual Report of New York University Conference on Labor at page
261 (1948).
82 In Matter of Alexander Milburn Company, 62 N.L.R.B. 482, 510 (1945);
12 N.L.R.B. ANN. Ra. 36 (1947).
83 See Senator Taft's remarks 93 Cong. Rec. 6860 (1947).
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men t that the party desiring to terminate or modify the agree-
ment must notify the other party in writing sixty days before
the expiration of the contract or sixty days before the proposed
termination or modification, offer to meet with the other party
for the purpose of negotating a new agreement, notify the
various state and federal mediation services within thirty
days after the first notice if no agreement has been reached,
and continue the existing agreement in effect for sixty days
after the first notice or until the expiration of the contract,
whichever is later, without restoring to a strike or lockout.
As an additional assurance to the observance of this section
other than the possible remedial order directing the offending
party to bargain, any employee who engages in a strike dur-
ing this period shall lose his status as an employee for the
purposes of the protection of the Act. It would seem, how-
ever, that the strike necessarily would have to be one which
was associated with a demand for termination or modification
of the collective bargaining agreement and not merely one
arising out of some unrelated grievance.
Under the Taft-Hartley Act the principle of majority rule
continues to exist but in amending the proviso of section
9 (a) 8' new importance is given to the individual employee's
rights within the frame work of a system governed by ma-
jority rule. 85 Under the Wagner Act the Board with court ap-
proval" had given the proviso only limited effect thus sub-
merging the rights of the individual employee to the rights
of the exclusive bargaining representative; the individual had
the right of presenting his grievance but the exclusive bar-
gaining representative was given the right to be present and
negotiate at every stage of consideration of the grievance.
The revised proviso would make it clear that the employee's
right to present grievances exists independently of the rights
of the bargaining representative and thus the individual in
84 1 9(a) "That any individual employee or group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such griev-
ance adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long
as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect. Provided further, That the bargaining rep.
resentative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment."
85 Torff, Taft-Hartley Act and Collective Bargaining 43 ILL. L. Rav. 828, 851
(1948).
8e N.L.R.B. v. Hughes Tool Co., 147 F. (2d) 69 (C.C.A. 6th 1945); 10 N.L,.RB.
Arn. Rap. 63-64 (1945).
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presenting his grievance may become the dominant figure and
the bargaining representative the "silent listener."'T
CONCLUSION.
Since 1935 the federal labor policy has been charted through
the administration of the Wagner Act which dealt prmiarily
with the establishing of a free uncoerced atmosphere for
collective bargaining by seeking to dissipate the effect of
certain conduct on the part of employers determined to inter-
fere with the employees right of free organization. While the
Taft-Hartley Act represents a substantial shift in the federal
labor policy by adding restrictions on the conduct of labor
organizations thus making both employers and labor organiza-
tions amenable to remedial orders of the Board. It must
not be overlooked that Title I is, in fact, the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, and that a great bulk of the
Wagner Act is retained. As indicated within the scope of this
article, many of the amendments affecting the employer unfair
labor practices were dictated by twelve years experience in
the administration of the Wagner Act and not without careful
consideration should they be discarded automatically in a
general antipathy toward an Act bearing the approval of the
80th Congress.
Sound labor relations cannot be established by litigation;
neither can sound labor relations be fostered and promoted as
the result of extremes and various "trends." Rather, harmo-
nious labor relations flow from a well established policy ac-
cepted by the parties coupled with the cooperation of the
parties through mutual trust and respect. While changes in
policy are not to be condemned, in as much- as amendments to
this Act are almost a certainty, moderation and understanding
must he the keynote. Accordingly, the primary purpose of
this article is to survey the underlying reason and resulting
effect of some of the amendments upon the employer unfair
labor practices, thus aiding in an informed consideration of
the direction of any proposed change in our current labor
policy.
87 Senate Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong. lst Seas. (1947).
NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
Volume 25 January, 1949 Number 1
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION OF NORTH DAKOTA
George A. Soule
President
Eugene A. Burdick
Secretary- Treasurer
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
George F. Shafer
Vice President
(Deceased)
Ronald N. Davies, Chairman
Dean 0. H. Thormodsgard
Richard C. Maxwell
Charles F. Peterson
Henry G. Ruemmele
Marion Jane Leslie
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA SCHOOL OF LAW
STUDENT EDITORIAL BOARD
James E. Leahy
Editor-in-Chief
Francis E. Foughty Clair M. Ghylin
Ernst A. Paul
Dudley Butts
Associate Editor
Elizabeth A. Kelly
Faculty Advisor
Richard C. Maxwell
The North Dakota Bar Briefs is published quarterly in January, April,
July and October by the State Bar Association of North Dakota. Commu-
nications should be directed to: The Executive Director, North Dakota
Bar Association, Box 327, Grand Forks, North Dakota.
